Ameek Singh

Research papers

• October 2026Job market paper

  Learning-by-Doing at Home: The Childhood Origins of Girls' Domestic Work

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  Abstract. The output of household work is rarely observed, particularly for individual members, making gendered comparative advantage difficult to measure. I develop a model-based test using household consumption per minute of domestic work: lower opportunity cost alone cannot raise this measure, whereas productive capacity can. I exploit rainfall-induced variation in household-production demand in rural India to study how such capacity forms. A one-standard-deviation rainfall increase at ages 4–7 raises girls' domestic work at ages 12–17 by 5.3 minutes daily. The estimate for boys is 1.0 minute and insignificant; infancy rainfall has no persistent effect for either gender. Effects concentrate among eldest daughters. Households whose eldest daughter experienced favourable early-childhood rainfall obtain 4–10 percent more consumption per minute, depending on current rainfall. Despite lower study time, I find little evidence of adverse effects on enrolment, grade progression, or measured learning. The results are consistent with early domestic-work engagement building task-specific productive capacity.

  JEL codes: D13, J24, J16, J22, J13, O15, O12.

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• June 2026Revising second draft

  Building Relationships in Supply Chains: Evidence from the Rwanda Coffee Sector with Rocco Macchiavello, Iris Steenkamp, and Mohamed Abouaziza

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  Abstract. Agricultural supply chains in low-income countries are constrained by weak relational contracts. Smallholder farmers need support to upgrade their farms, while downstream buyers hesitate to invest when future deliveries are uncertain. We study a programme in Rwanda that clarifies expectations and benefits in a tier-based relationship between coffee farmers and a multinational exporter. Sixteen months later, we randomise incentives for costly farm-upgrading activities. Farmers offered the clarity sessions are more likely to take up the demanding contract, which pays after both upgrading and delivery, but no more likely to take the simpler upfront contract. Measures of clarity, trust, and traceability indicate that the initial sessions strengthened the relational contract.

• October 2025Field trial in progress

  Building Relational Contracts: Testing the Role of Compliance Verifiability with Iris Steenkamp

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  Abstract. Credible promises are central to relational contracts, but small suppliers often lack verifiable records of their own compliance. We study this problem in Rwanda's coffee supply chain, where a multinational buyer offers smallholder farmers incentives for costly sustainability actions. Treated farmers receive an officially stamped booklet recording each completed step, without changing the buyer's internal record-keeping system. The intervention gives farmers a portable compliance record that can make promised payments easier to verify. We design measurement to separate this accountability channel from reminders, progress salience, and reciprocity. Preliminary evidence indicates that treated farmers increase programme take-up by 20%, mostly among women farmers.

• July 2025Field trial in progress

  Optimal Implementation of PES in Supply Chains: Monitoring Cost vs Benefits Leakage with Rocco Macchiavello and Iris Steenkamp

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  Abstract. Payments for ecosystem services can address climate change and rural poverty, but monitoring costs often limit scale. In our setting, smallholder coffee farmers are paid to plant seedlings for agroforestry. We test whether low-cost call-centre monitoring can reduce verification costs without weakening compliance incentives or increasing payments to non-compliant farmers. The experiment varies monitoring protocols to quantify trade-offs between take-up, reporting accuracy, implementation cost, and programme leakage, and tests ways to improve phone-based reporting.

• May 2025Preparing draft

  Leveraging Supply Chains for Farm Upgrading: Formalizing Relational Contracts with Rocco Macchiavello and Iris Steenkamp

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  Abstract. Coffee trees need to be stumped every 8–12 years, leaving them fallow for 2–3 years but increasing future productivity. In Rwanda, small farms make this temporary income loss difficult to absorb, while downstream buyers hesitate to finance rejuvenation without credible future delivery commitments. We compare a delivery-contingent contract, in which farmers receive support conditional on later delivery to the buyer, with an upfront contract for farm-upgrading actions alone. The delivery-contingent contract has lower take-up, but increases subsequent delivery, making supply-chain investment more self-enforcing and scalable.

• June 2024Data collection complete

  Lawyers and Development

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  Abstract. I harmonise 250+ nationally representative datasets from 50+ countries to measure legal employment across countries and over time. Lawyers per capita rise with development, both across countries and within countries, driven primarily by the legal-services sector rather than public-sector or in-house legal employment. Lawyers' wages keep pace with expanded supply, suggesting that the pattern is not explained only by education. I rationalise these facts with a model in which legal services provide knowledge of regulatory boundaries.

  (Project on the bench — data collection complete.)